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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF MR.
WAINWRIGHT
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: I would hate to have to get a product
cleared in the European Community. I hope you could do it in one lifetime.
Let me play the devil's advocate on this whole clearance process and ask,
what about the role of competitors in opposing the clearance process? Sup-
pose you have, hypothetically, someone in Germany who has a good product
that has been approved by the Commission. Then, somebody in France has
something better, but it is competitive. Do you sense that all these procedures
can be used by competitors to plant seeds of doubt in the minds of the Com-
mission's staff? In a multi-national context, you may have some built-in eco-
nomic conflicts which realize themselves in this whole clearance process. I
am asking you to comment on that as an individual.
ANSWER, MR. WAINWRIGHT: That goes without saying, Henry. I
think the first obvious thing to say is, of course, there may well be patents
involved here. If patents are involved, then the patent will overrule those
European patents, and if the first part is covered by a patent, that would be
covered in the normal way. But supposing that there is no patent protection
involved, then it is perfectly possible, and indeed, it has happened, that the
same product developed by different manufacturers could be authorized.
There may have even been the temptation for competitors to cast some
doubts about the safety of the other competitor's product. If there have been
such temptations, they no longer exist. The problem is not so much an inter-
competitive problem within the industry as it is a problem of the industry in a
sense against the world. The risk is, of course, as soon as you start to cast
doubt on the health or environmental point of view of the products of one of
your competitors, you throw the stone into the pond, the ripples go out and
they can affect your own product as well. You have to be very careful about
casting any kind of doubts on the safety of each other's products because of
the ripple or ricochet effect.
QUESTION, MR. SULZENKO: I am not an expert in this, but as I un-
derstand the Canadian and U.S. approval system, applications are handled by
what I would call quasi-independent agencies. Although there is some politi-
cal input in the Canadian and U.S. systems, the E.U. system seems to be very
political. It strikes me that there is potential for a trade clash given that we
have quite different systems. Do you see that over time, as these technologies
become more and more important, trade disputes will become almost inevi-
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table because Canada and the United States have different approval systems
than Europe?
ANSWER, MR. WAINWRIGHT: I think the answer is yes. Perhaps I
should mention a related sector where the community has succeeded in
handing out all the basic work to an agency, which is the area of the approval
of pharmaceuticals. For high-tech, biotech, and other important new drugs,
we now have a system where all the spade work is done by an agency in
London, and then a relatively formal, final procedure is carried out. Then, the
Commission, still with a committee of the Member States, gives their final
seal of approval. I have to say that this has worked well. I do not know of any
case where, at least up until now, there was any political interference.
In the case of genetic engineering, it is perfectly true that the system is
more political in the sense that there is no independent agency that carries out
the assessment. There is, in fact, always a scientific assessment that is carried
out. It is a public document that is the basis for the final decision. To be fair,
the Commission has always followed the opinions of the scientific committee
in its proposals for a final decision. The difficulties have arisen because the
whole process has been slowed down because of the regulatory ping-pong
between the Commission and the Consulate Ministers, because the Standing
Committee was not able to give a positive opinion. In a sense, it has even
been more bewildered by the fact that some Member States have just not
been prepared to go along, even once the final approval has been given by
the Commission. Some of them, such as Austria and Luxembourg, use the
safeguard mechanisms, which cause quite a bit of delay. On the question of
labeling, quite frankly all the Member States are going their own way until
this is taken up by the Commission.
So there is a political dimension in this, which is not necessarily built into
the system, but the system gives us an opportunity to play. If we had an
agency-type system, we could have avoided this. Still, I am not so sure they
would have made any difference. I think we may well find it will make a bit
of difference on the labeling issue. We may find ourselves before the WTO
on this issue, as we have on others. That depends to some extent on you.
QUESTION, MR. WOODS: In the last generation of trade disputes in the
old GATT, the European Commission had the delightful task of taking on
Canada and the liquor boards in dealing with our subnationals and the de-
lightful task of being a third party when Canada and the United States went
after each other on our state and provincial deregulations. Given that there is
I See Canada - Import, Distribution, and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Mar-
keting Authorities, Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35 th Supp.), at 37 (1988); Canada - Import,
Distribution, and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, Feb. 19,
1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.), at 27 (1992).
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the distinct possibility for disputes in the areas of technology, what are your
views in terms of our ability to count on the Commission and the European
Union to be able to enforce any judgment which involves these issues, which
are so sensitive with the Member States? Basically, it is a European constitu-
tional issue.
Then the second question, which is more practical for private practitio-
ners in Canada and the United States, is for corporate counsel, people who
want to be able to follow this without necessarily engaging in the govern-
ment-to-government discussions. Do you have any advice about where they
could go? Perhaps there are Web sites or other means by which they infor-
mally or formally could follow what is going on in Brussels?
ANSWER, MR. WAINWRIGHT: I think your first question, the question
of enforcement of a possible WTO negative report, divides itself up into two
parts. The first is the general question of enforcement within the Union and
the international strength of E.U. law. The mechanisms are all there, and
there is the possibility of using the national court procedures. The Commis-
sion has mechanisms for bringing Member States before the Court. Also, we
are now just starting to use the possibilities of getting financial sanctions
against Member States who refuse to obey Court orders. The mechanisms are
all there, but of course, it takes a long time to enforce.
We are in an interim phase now, and we have a virtual Commission.
When the new members come into power and take office in September, I
have no reason to believe they will want to be any less keen on this sort of
enforcement and be fair. At the governmental level, there are, of course, the
enforcement mechanisms of the WTO itself. We have just had a final opinion
of the WTO, which has actually ordered the European Community to pay
$191 million worth of compensation for the banana regime.2 We are likely to
have on the 13th of May a similar result, with similar sorts of figures in rela-
tion to hormones in beef. Of course, these take the shape of either positive or
negative trade concessions. That is at an intergovernmental level, and I do
not have any reason to believe that would not work.
2 See European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of
Bananas, Award of the Arbitrator, Jan. 7, 1998, WT/DS27/15; World Trade Organization,
Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes (last modified July 16, 1999)
<http:/www.wto.orglwto/disputelbulletin.htm>; see also Carla Santos, The WTO and the
Banana Case: Implications for Future E.U.-A.C.P. Relations, 36 E.U. Focus 3 (1999).
3 See European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), Decision by the Arbitrators, July 12, 1999, WT/DS48/ARB; World Trade Organiza-
tion, Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes, supra note 2; see also U.S. Wins Round
in Beef Dispute (visited July 20, 1999) <http://www.amarillo globenews.com/stories/050997/
wins.htn>.
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Your second question was with regard to access to information and to
people. As for access to information, there is a European Commission Web
site. All the documentation of the official journal is on the Web site. Of
course, there are also all the communications, all the pronouncements of the
Commission, and all the debates of Parliament, which can be accessed
through the Internet. As to whether that is quite enough for a lobbyist, I have
had plenty of dealings with lobbyists in my job. My impression is that there
is nothing like personal contact, which means knowing the people who are on
the floor, not necessarily at the top level. I know a few particular U.S. law
firms that are good with this, and they sometimes ring me to ask who is the
girl on the phone, and I am happy to tell them.
QUESTION, MS. JEFFREY: It seems to me that you have expressed a
view that is far more about cultural change than it is about technological
change. I just want to make a slight case that I think we should be careful to
de-legitimize the cultural aspects of what you are presenting here.
I want to put the question to you this way. We are not only talking here
about consumers, but we are also clearly talking about citizens. I am a little
concerned about whether the WTO was, in fact, the appropriate place to be
making some of the decisions we are talking about regarding matters that, in
the case you are presenting, individual citizens may wish to make for them-
selves or jurisdictions may wish to allow their citizens who have elected
them to make. For example, in the case of labeling a genetically engineered
product, I would put that on the cultural side. Where is that democratic le-
gitimacy? Where is the counter-balance to the argument and the case you are
making to us in the WTO, or in some of the other regulatory regimes that you
have presented so effectively?
I am not asking you to make the case for the side of which you clearly do
not seem to be in favor, and I know you are speaking in a personal capacity,
but just give me some sense as to where is the cultural, democratic, and the
side of the citizens in what you are presenting?
ANSWER, MR. WAINWRIGHT: First, I should say that I was not mak-
ing a case. If it came out like that, it is because I am too much of a lawyer to
be able to speak neutrally. Of course, this is very much a raging debate in
Europe. We have seen this in other fields like television and the cinema,
where there is a sense that North America is trying to overwhelm Europe. Of
course, they do that to the rest of the world, too, with their culture and their
values. They are doing it without even trying. There are certain Member
States of the European Community, particularly France, which are much
more sensitive about these issues than others.
4 See European Commission Home Page (visited July 20, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/
comm/indexen.htm>.
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To get back to specifics, I know the WTO system quite well. It is not my
number one area of expertise, but I rather suspect that pure labeling require-
ments and nothing more would get through the WTO hoops and would not be
regarded as contrary to either the agreement on technical barriers to trade or
the sanitary-phytosanitary regime of the WTO.
There is, of course, a more fundamental issue, which is to what extent the
WTO, which is essentially GATT, carries on most of these things. We are
already in the GATT, of course, because we have more effective enforcement
mechanisms, and it is now becoming more of an issue. To what extent has
this gone too far, and to what extent is the risk of trade and commercial val-
ues overriding local sensibilities, whether they are cultural, environmental, or
astrological? I do not think there is any one answer to that.
In the United States, you are in the midst of an interesting trade war. As I
understand it, there were some conflicts with foreigh countries over fishing
for turtles, where the environmental sensitivities of the U.S. consumer or
citizen are apparently not shared the same by the citizens of Thailand or In-
dia.5 This is not just uniquely a North American/European thing. It can hap-
pen in different ways and at different levels.
There is a balance to be struck. It is gradually being struck, and as the
case law of the WTO builds up, then perhaps it will be struck more and more.
The beef hormones saga is a good example. The dispute settlement body, the
Appellate Body, was much less hard and was more nuisanced about the
Community regime, and, in fact the European Community thinks they may,
with more time, be able to satisfy them.
So the story has not yet come to an end, but I take your point. There are
two sides to the story, and the debate will continue.
QUESTION, MR. ABRAHAMS: I would like to know the status of the
transatlantic discussions regarding mutual recognition of U.S. and E.U. prod-
uct standards. Has that essentially been put on hold because of the recent
upheaval at the European Commission because of the arguments about beef
hormones and bananas? I refer very specifically to electric products, for ex-
ample, with the U.L. label. Would that not, perhaps in the future, require CE
marking because of that mutual recognition discretion?
ANSWER, MR. WAINWRIGHT: As I understand it, as a result of the
WTO, there have been a series of mutual recognition agreements that are
under negotiation or have already been negotiated between the European
Union and the United States and Canada and other parties as well. Some of
these agreements have been signed, sealed, and brought into force. I cannot
give you an actual list, but this is mostly, if not exclusively, with regard to
5 See United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report
of the Appellate Body, Oct. 12, 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R.
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industrial products. I have not heard what has been affected particularly by
the genetic engineering or the beef hormones issues. We are talking about
industrial products here, and those are not affected by the fact that members
of the Commission have resigned. The Commission can still carry on current
business until the new Commission comes on board in September. The
Commission negotiates agreements with a mandate from the Consulate Min-
isters. If they have a number of mandates, they can carry on the negotiations,
and they can even propose to Council to conclude any agreement as part of
business.
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